On the Problem of Breathing, Eating, & Drinking Poison: An introduction to problem solving, nobility of purpose under adverse circumstances, and the search for truth with Sir Karl Popper on Prince Edward Island by Funk, Matt
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
On the Problem of Breathing, Eating, &
Drinking Poison: An introduction to
problem solving, nobility of purpose
under adverse circumstances, and the






MPRA Paper No. 14483, posted 6. April 2009 08:30 UTC
On the Problem of Breathing, Eating, & Drinking Poison—
An introduction to problem solving, nobility of purpose under adverse circumstances, 
and the search for truth with Karl Popper
on
Prince Edward Island




The Linnean Society of London
matt@funkisland.org
Eppur si muove[1]
1 “I, Galileo, son of the late Vincenzo Galilei, Florentine, aged seventy years, arraigned personally before this tribunal, and kneeling 
before  you, Most  Eminent  and Reverend  Lord  Cardinals, Inquisitors-General  against  heretical  depravity  throughout  the  entire 
Christian commonwealth, having before my eyes and touching with my hands, the Holy Gospels, swear that I have always believed, do 
believe, and by God's help will in the future believe, all that is held, preached, and taught by the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. 
But whereas -- after an injunction had been judicially intimated to me by this Holy Office, to the effect that I must altogether abandon 
the false opinion that the sun is the center of the world and immovable, and that the earth is not the center of the world, and moves, 
and that I must not hold, defend, or teach in any way whatsoever, verbally or in writing, the said false doctrine, and after it had been 
notified to me that the said doctrine was contrary to Holy Scripture -- I wrote and printed a book in which I discuss this new 
doctrine already condemned, and adduce arguments of great cogency in its favor, without presenting any solution of these, and for 
this reason I have been pronounced by the Holy Office to be vehemently suspected of heresy, that is to say, of having held and believed 
that the Sun is the center of the world and immovable, and that the earth is not the center and moves.
     Therefore, desiring to remove from the minds of your Eminences, and of all faithful Christians, this vehement suspicion, justly  
conceived against  me, with  sincere  heart  and unfeigned faith  I  abjure, curse, and detest  the aforesaid  errors  and heresies, and 
generally every other error, heresy, and sect whatsoever contrary to the said Holy Church, and I swear that in the future I will never 
again say or assert, verbally or in writing, anything that might furnish occasion for a similar suspicion regarding me; but that should I 
know any heretic, or person suspected of heresy, I will denounce him to this Holy Office, or to the Inquisitor or Ordinary of the 
place where I may be. Further, I swear and promise to fulfill and observe in their integrity all penances that have been, or that shall 
be, imposed upon me by this Holy Office. And, in the event of my contravening, (which God forbid) any of these my promises and 
oaths, I submit myself to all the pains and penalties imposed and promulgated in the sacred canons and other constitutions, general 
and particular, against such delinquents. So help me God, and these His Holy Gospels, which I touch with my hands
     I, the said Galileo Galilei, have abjured, sworn, promised, and bound myself as above; and in witness of the truth thereof I have 
with my own hand subscribed the present document of my abjuration, and recited it word for word at Rome, in the Convent of 
Minerva, this twenty-second day of June, 1633. 
     I, Galileo Galilei, have abjured as above with my own hand.”
    Legend has it that as Galileo rose to his feet, he said under his breath, Eppur si muove [And yet, it moves].  The remark captivated 
scientists and scholars for centuries, as it represented defiance of obscurantism and nobility of purpose in the search for truth under 
the most adverse circumstances [Hawking 2002, as cited in Galilei 1638, pp xi-xiii].
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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces Karl Popper's approach to problem solving in the social sciences. 
These methods fundamentally represent  the scientific method of the natural sciences. 
Popper's problem solving technique is outlined in six steps, including an introductory 
treatment of his solution to Hume's Problem of Induction.  These six steps are then applied 
in the form of a test and logical deduction of our illustrative theory: Cancer rates on Prince  
Edward Island have dramatically increased as a result of an extraordinary increase (900% in the  
past decade) in potato production, and a corollary increase of secondary agricultural inputs, namely  
a increase of chlorothalonil (trade name: Bravo) applications in less than ten years.  We conclude 
our theory is true and, in order to complete our demonstration of Popper's methods, 
open this  theory to criticism and refutations.  APPENDIX A offers  a  brief  review of 
relevant literature on the philosophy of science, and APPENDIX B offers readers a brief 
introduction to the fundamentals of relevant island-based methods.
The author would like to thank
Godfrey Baldacchino
for his comments and criticisms.
Key words:  Popper, Hume, Hayek, truth, scientific method, philosophy of science, 
induction,  economics,  island  studies,  insularity,  dependency,  Prince  Edward  Island, 
closed societies, confederacy of dunces, commercial agriculture, cancer, chlorothalonil, 
Bravo, manufacture of consent.
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Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre minds.  The mediocre mind is  
incapable of understanding the man who refuses to bow blindly to conventional prejudices and chooses  
instead to express his opinions courageously and honestly.
—Albert Einstein, in a letter to the department of Philosophy at the College of the City of 
New York, criticizing the refusal of the appointment of Bertrand Russell, 1940
In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act.
—George Orwell, 1984, 1949
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INTRODUCTION
1. Science = Problem Solving:
The natural as well as the social sciences always start from problems, from the fact that something inspires 
amazement  in  us, as  the  Greek  philosophers  used  to  say.  To  solve  these  problems, the  sciences  use 
fundamentally the same method that common sense employs, the method of trial and error.  To be more 
precise, it  is  the  method of trying out solutions to our problem and then discarding the false  ones as 
erroneous.  This  method assumes that we work with a large number of  experimental solutions.  One 
solution after another is put to the test and eliminated.[1]
2. Problem Solving[2] =All Life 
This procedure seems to be the only logical one.  It is also the procedure that a lower organism, even a 
single-cell  amoeba, uses when trying to solve a problem.  In this  case we speak of testing movements 
through which the organism tries to rid itself of a troublesome problem.  Higher organisms are able to 
learn through trial and error how a certain problem should be solved.  We may say that they too make 
testing movements—mental testings—and that to learn is essentially to try out one testing movement after 
another until one is found that solves the problem.  We might compare the animal's successful solution to 
an expectation and hence to a hypothesis or a theory.  For the animal's behaviour shows us that it expects 
(perhaps unconsciously...) that in a similar case the same testing movements will again solve the problem in 
question.[3]
3. Scientific Method = [0], 
I assert that no scientific method exists...  To put it in a more direct way:
(i)  There is no method of discovering a scientific theory.
(ii)  There  is  no  method  of  ascertaining  the  truth  of  a  scientific  hypothesis,  i.e.,  no  method  of  
verification.
(iii)  There is no method of ascertaining whether a hypothesis is 'probable', or probably true.[4] 
Our brief introduction to problem solving with Karl Popper is encapsulated within these three axioms.  We 
trust the first two points are fairly straightforward: (1) Science is problem solving, thus it must begin with a problem, 
and (2) that all things living are constantly engaged in problem solving (The Struggle for Life).[5]  Our third tenant, 
however, may appear to present an untenable and vicious circle, but Popper is merely emphasizing the critical point 
that, contrary to the assertion of many, there is no single way to solve problems.  All problems and all solutions are 
unique, thus we have no single scientific method. 
1 Popper 1999, p3
2 Popper 1992, pp vii-viii
3 Ibid
4 Popper 1956, pp 5-6
5 Darwin 1859
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 There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. 
My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative 
intuition’, in Bergson’s sense.  In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws 
. . . from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction.  There is no logical path’, he 
says, ‘leading to these... laws.  They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an 
intellectual love (‘Einfühlung’) of the objects of experience’.[1] 
And although we may consider our assertion of the non-existence of scientific method was held by 
Einstein,[2] Whewell,[3] Russell, and Reichenbach,[4]  we will not imply validation by resting on these laurels, we will, 
rather, illustrate the implications of this assertion with an applicable example:
Our present approach to problem solving, for example, may be described as an archipelago of inter-
connected islands of theories and thought, namely the modern synthesis of evolutionary biology, cultural evolution, 
Austrian economics,[5] Icelandic freedom,[6] and Swiss democracy[7]—all within a framework which acknowledges 
1 Popper 1959, p 37
2 Einstein’s genius reminds us that a society’s competitive advantage comes not from teaching the multiplication or periodic tables but 
from nurturing rebels…. And, as recent research into Einstein’s personal papers shows, there’s no better glimpse into his offbeat 
creativity than the way he puzzled out the special theory of relativity…. Einstein alienated so many professors that he was unable to 
earn a doctorate, much less land an academic job.  At the age of 26, he was working as a third-class examiner at the Swiss patent office 
in Bern…. Other scientists had come close to his insight, but they were too confined by the dogmas of the day.  Einstein alone was impertinent 
enough to discard the notion of absolute time, one of the sacred tenets of classical physics since Newton.  “Imagination is more 
important than knowledge,” Einstein later said.  Indeed, if we are ever going to unravel the further mysteries of dark matter, come up  
with a unified theory, or discover the true nature of energy, we should carve that proclamation above all of our blackboards [italics  
mine, Isaacson 2007, pp35-36].
3 Scientific discovery must ever depend upon some happy thought, of which we cannot trace the origin; — some fortunate cast of  
intellect rising above all rules.  No precepts will elevate a man of ordinary endowments to the level of a man of genius: nor will an 
inquirer of truly inventive mind need to come to the teacher of inductive philosophy to learn how to exercise the faculties which 
nature has given him (Whewell 1849, p 117).
4 See Reichenbach 1951
5 (a) Economics is not an intellectual game. Economics is deadly serious. The very future of mankind—of civilization—depends, in 
Mises’ view, upon widespread understanding of, and respect for, the principles of economics (Kirzner 2006, p1).
(b) The assumption that  economists (italics Hayek’s) can find predictable solutions to economic problems is undoubtedly the most 
inhibiting force in… economics. It has led to the increasing isolation of theoretical economists from the day-to-day practitioners of 
the subject—the actual participants in an economy, the consumers and the producers (Hayek, Bartley, & Kresege 1991, pp 8-9). 
(c) What made Vienna the distinctive city that it was, as much as any other the fount of Western culture, is a question to be kept in 
mind…What we might observe is that a milieu such as that in which Hayek [and Popper] spent his childhood and youth, a society in 
which  family  and associates, position  and accomplishment, knowledge  and history  were  so tightly  intertwined, meant  that  the 
members of such a society were quickly and always apprised of what mattered [italics Bartley’s]. This is no small feat, as any teacher of 
the present generation of youth knows too well. It is the significance [italics Bartley’s] of knowledge and information that leads to the 
evolution of understanding (Hayek, Bartley, & Kresge 1991, p 5).
6 “Size isn't everything by any means,” he said aloud to the dog, as if suspecting her of entertaining high ideas.  “Take my word for it, 
freedom is of more account than the height of a roof beam.  I ought to know; mine cost me eighteen years' slavery.  The man who 
lives on his own land is a n independent man.  Hi is his own master.  If I can keep my sheep alive through the winter and can pay what  
has been stipulated from year to year—then I pay what has been stipulated; and I have kept my sheep alive.  No, it is freedom that we 
are all after, Titla.  He who pays his way is a king.  He who keeps his sheep alive through the winter lives in a palace” (Laxness 1946, p 
13).
7 (a) British democracy owes its emergence to a sense of pride and independence among the upper nobility… Swiss democracy 
resulted  not  from  the  pride, independence, and  individualism  of  an  upper  nobility,  but  from  the  pride,  independence,  and 
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the incessant noise, misinformation, and irrationality generated by The Problem of Induction,[1] The Problem of Closed  
Societies,[2]  The Problem of Manufactured Consent[3], and The Problem of Media Toxicity.[4] 
We are deluged with an unending torrent of clever “new” interdisciplinary, intra-disciplinary, multidisciplinary, 
and pluri-disciplinary fields of study.  In economics alone, we have neoclassical economics, Austrian economics, 
behavioural economics, experimental economics, new institutional economics, ecological economics, and 
neuroeconomics—just to name a few.   And yes, of course they are all in fact interdisciplinary—can you imagine a 
“monodisciplinary” science?  Even physics must acknowledge the reality that humans conduct the experiments, 
interpret the results, and apply them within a social construct.  I submit there is not a branch of science that is not  
multidisciplinary, intra-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary, or pluri-disciplinary.
individualism of mountain farmers.
     These  completely different beginnings  and traditions  have led  to  quite  different traditional  institutions  and quite  different 
traditional systems of values (Popper 1958, pp 81-82). 
(b) The problem is to provide incentives for those so entrusted to act on behalf of those who they are supposed to be serving—the 
standard principle agent problem. Democracy—contestability in political processes—provides a check on abuses of the powers that 
come from delegation just as it does in economic processes; but just as we recognize that the take-over mechanism provides an 
imperfect check, so too we should recognize that the electoral process provides an imperfect check. Just as we recognize that current 
management has an incentive to increase asymmetries of information in order to enhance its market power, increase its discretion, so 
to in public life.  And just as we recognize that disclosure requirements—greater transparency—and specific rules of the game (e.g. 
related  to  corporate  governance)  can  affect  the  effectiveness  of  the  take-over  mechanism  and  the  overall  quality  of  corporate 
governance, so too the same factors can affect political contestabilty and the quality of public governance (Stiglitz 2001, p 522 - 523).
1 See Hume 1739
2 Popper 1945.  Also see Soros 2006
3 That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is 
certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands 
the process are plain enough.
     The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of 
democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than on 
rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of 
democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power. 
     Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of  
popular government. None of us begins to understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of 
how to create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political premise...It has been demonstrated that we 
cannot  rely  upon intuition, conscience, or  the  accidents  of  casual  opinion if  we are  to  deal  with  the  world  beyond our reach 
(Lippmann 1922, p 158).  Also see Herman & Chomsky 1988.
4 A certain Canadian city was unable to receive any TV signals up until 1973, due to its location in a steep valley. Otherwise, it was  
similar to two cities in the vicinity used as control cases. A study by Williams (1986) suggests that the introduction of TV crowded out  
other activities, in particular those outside the home, such as sports’ activities and visiting clubs. It also reduced the reading abilities 
and creative thinking of children and fostered more aggressive behavior and stereotyped ideas about gender roles. TV also reduced 
the problem solving capacities of adults (Frey, Benesch & Stutzer 2005, p 8).
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Herbert Simon, in his entry ‘behavioural economics’ in  The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law, 
1998,  pointed out that the term ‘behavioral economics’ is a sort of pleonasm, for what else is economics 
about than a study of human behavior. How could it possibly be that all the work done in departments of 
psychology,  sociology  and  anthropology  are  irrelevant  to  economics?  The  discovery  of  behavioral 
economics in the past decade or two is really a return to reality from an untenable position that the rational 
optimizing model is the only framework for economics (Shiller 2000, p 4).
Yes, this reasoning is sound, but it does not follow its own truth to the complete and logical conclusion, 
because even 'economics'[1] does not exist.  Consider the first sentence of the first chapter of the first book of 
Marshall’s (1890) Principles of Economics: “Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary 
business of life.”  Although we're getting closer to the heart of the matter, Marshall did not consider the biosphere, 
atmosphere, nor lithosphere part of the ordinary business of life.  Thus 'externalities' such as pollution, extinction, and 
deforestation were outside the so-called subject of 'economics' and were left to 'other subject matters' to deal with, 
and thus, we begin to understand that the so-called 'science' of economics has generated convenient but life-
threatening myths.  Moreover, we begin to understand the absolute truth of On the Non-Existence of Subject Matters, a 
paper Sir Karl Popper delivered at a meeting of the Fellows of the 'Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral 
Sciences' at Stanford, California, in November of 1956:
As a rule, I begin my lectures on Scientific Method by telling my students that scientific method does not 
exist.  I add that I ought to know, having been, for a time at least, the one and only professor of this non-
existent subject within the British Commonwealth.
     It is in several senses that my subject does not exist, and I shall mention a few of them.
   First, my subject does not exist because subject matters in general do not exist.  There are no subject  
matters; no branches of learning—or, rather, of enquiry: there are only problems, and the urge to solve them  [italics 
mine].  A  science  such  as  botany  or  chemistry  (or  say, physical  chemistry, or  electrochemistry)  is, I 
contend, merely an administrative unit.  University administrators have a difficult job anyway, and it is a 
great convenience to them to work on the assumption that there are some named subjects, with chairs 
attached to them to be filled by the experts in these subjects (pp 5-6).
1 There is only one social science.... While scientific work in anthropology and political science and the like will become increasingly 
indistinguishable from economics, economists  will  reciprocally have to become aware of how constraining has been their tunnel 
vision about the nature of  man and social  interaction. Ultimately, good economics will  also have to be good anthropology and 
sociology and political science and psychology (Landa 1999, p 7).
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Again, when it all comes down in the end, all life is problem solving,[1]  and “no man can be a pure specialist  
without being in the strict sense an idiot” (Shaw 1903, ln 41).
If we consider The Problem of Global Warming, for example there is no single academic department able to 
solve this problem, as the problem spans ecology, economics, political science, physics, evolutionary biology, etc.  It 
is not critical to accept the assertion that subject matters do not exist, but it may be critical to understand why 
subject matters may not exist, as this false and misguided assumption has inhibited and continues to inhibit our 
ability to find a meaningful solution.  It is thus, by use of the same logic, equally important to understand why no 
single scientific method exists.
Generally speaking, the particular methods employed will depend upon the nature of the enquiry and the 
ultimate purpose of the particular problem solving endeavour (the solution's intended audience).  Let's consider 
the solution to a single, relatively simple problem as presented to three separate audiences:  The opportunity to 
study Islands at the one and only Master's program in island studies presents several enticing value propositions and 
a few potential problems as well:  A prospective student must decide if the investment in time and money is a 
feasible and/or worthwhile pursuit.  Would this quest bear the fruits of knowledge, reveal hidden truths, and offer 
illuminating island elixirs?  Would the journey offer a rare and valuable islander's perspective?  An Earth Island 
perspective?  Opportunities?  Solutions to critical problems?  Exotic sojourns?  
Naturally, the considerations are manifold, many of which may or may not be fully formed and articulated 
in the mind of the prospective student, but one consideration which must be addressed, either directly or 
1 The natural as well as the social sciences always start from problems, from the fact that something inspires amazement in us, as the 
Greek philosophers used to say.  To solve these problems, the sciences use fundamentally the same method that common sense 
employs, the method of trial  and error.  To be more precise, it is the method of trying out solutions to our problem and then 
discarding the false ones as erroneous.  This method assumes that we work with a large number of experimental solutions.  One 
solution after another is put to the test and eliminated (Popper 1999).
At bottom, this procedure seems to be the only logical one.  It is also the procedure that a lower organism, even a single-cell amoeba, 
uses when trying to solve a problem.  In this case we speak of testing movements through which the organism tries to rid itself of a 
troublesome problem.  Higher organisms are able to learn through trial and error how a certain problem should be solved.  We may 
say that they too make testing movements – mental testings – and that to learn is essentially to try out one testing movement after 
another until one is found that solves the problem.  We might compare the animal's successful solution to an expectation and hence to 
a hypothesis or a theory.  For the animal's behaviour shows us that it expects (perhaps unconsciously or dispositionally) that in a 
similar case the same testing movements will again solve the problme in question [all italics Popper's 1999, p3].
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indirectly, is  The Problem of Tuition.  If the candidate has the financial means to address this problem independently, 
the methodological treatment of this problem solving endeavour may pass unconsciously in an intuitive moment 
with a decision to simply register, pay tuition, and begin classes.  
The method will differ, however, depending upon necessary audiences.  If the student requires parental 
financial assistance, they may need to be able to articulate the reasons for their desire to study islands and forward 
persuasive arguments.  Perhaps the parents would like their hopeful progeny to jot down some of the goals 
associated with their desire to continue a formal education.  If the student requires financial aid or a grant, the 
method becomes even more formalized.  Perhaps they will be required to write an essay, detailing the basis for 
their desire to study islands, what they hope to accomplish in doing so, and what contributions they would 
endeavour to make.  Likewise, a psychologist may, for example, initially 'test' a theory in her own mind, or simply 
verbally run it past a colleague for criticism; or, perhaps she will submit this theory formally in an APA journal for 
criticism from a much broader audience.  Let's also briefly consider a more complex problem solving endeavour:
Evolutionary biology is a historical science It is very different from the exact sciences in its conceptual 
framework and methodology. It deals, to a large extent, with unique phenomena, such as the extinction of 
the dinosaurs, the origin of humans, the origin of evolutionary novelties, the explanation of evolutionary 
trends and rates, and the explanation of organic diversity. There is no way to explain these phenomena by 
laws.  Evolutionary  biology  tries  to  find  the  answer  to  “why”  questions.  Experiments  are  usually 
inappropriate for obtaining answers to evolutionary questions. We cannot experiment about the extinction 
of  the  dinosaurs  or  the  origin of  mankind. With the  experiment unavailable  for  research in historical 
biology, a remarkable new heuristic method has been introduced, that of historical narratives. Just as in 
much of theory formation, the scientist starts with a conjecture and thoroughly tests it for its validity, so in 
evolutionary biology the scientist constructs a historical narrative, which is then tested for its explanatory 
value. Let me illustrate this method by applying it to the extinction of the dinosaurs, which occurred at the 
end of the Cretaceous, about sixty-five million years ago. An early explanatory narrative suggested that 
they had become the victims of a particularly virulent epidemic against which they had been unable to 
acquire immunity. However, a number of serious objections were raised against this scenario, which was 
therefore replaced by a new proposal, according to which the extinction had been caused by a climatic 
catastrophe. However, neither  climatologists  nor geologists  were able  to find any evidence  for  such  a 
climatic event and this hypothesis also had to be abandoned. However, when the physicist Walter Alvarez 
postulated that the extinction of the dinosaurs had been caused by the consequences of an asteroid impact 
on earth, all observations fitted this new scenario. The discovery of the impact crater in Yucatan further 
strengthened  the  Alvarez  theory. No  subsequent  observations  were  in  conflict  with  this  theory. The 
methodology of historical narratives is clearly a methodology of historical science.1
  
1 Mayr 2004 pp 32-33
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METHOD
(I) THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, like that of the natural sciences, consists in trying out 
tentative solutions to those problems from which our investigations start.  Solutions are proposed and 
criticized. If a proposed solution is not open to objective criticism, then it is  excluded as unscientific, 
although perhaps only temporarily.
 (II) If the proposed solution is open to objective criticism, then we attempt to refute it; for all criticism 
consists in attempts at refutation.
 (III) If a proposed solution is refuted through our criticism we propose another solution. 
(IV) If it withstands criticism, we accept it temporarily; and we accept it, above all, as worthy of further 
discussion and criticism.
 (V)  Thus  the  method  of  science  is  one  of  the  tentative  attempts... to  solve  our  problems  which  are 
controlled by the most severe criticism. It is a critical development of the method of ‘trial and error’.
 (VI) The so-called objectivity of science lies in the objectivity of the critical method; that is, above all, in 
the fact that no theory is exempt from criticism, and further, in the fact that the logical instrument of 
criticism—the logical contradiction—is objective.[1] 
1 Popper 1992, pp. 66-67
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APPLICATION
Following is an example of Poppers six-step methodological approach to the social sciences at work in a 
simplified, yet very practical application.  Before embarking on a discourse on scientific method, however, please 
note
(1) my present design… is not to teach the method which each ought to follow for the right conduct of his 
reason, but solely to describe the way in which I have endeavoured to conduct my own…. This tract is put 
forth merely as... a tale, in which, amid some examples worthy of imitation, there will be found, perhaps, 
as many more which it were advisable not to follow, I hope it will prove useful to some without being 
hurtful to any, and that my openness will find some favour with all...  It is possible I may be mistaken; and 
it is but a little copper and glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds. I know how very liable we are 
to delusion in what relates to ourselves, and also how much the judgements of  our friends are to be 
suspected when given in our favour.[1] 
(2) False facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they often endure long; but false views, if 
supported  by some evidence, do little  harm, for  every  one takes  a  salutary  pleasure  in proving their 
falseness: and when this is done, one path towards error is closed and the road to truth is often at the same 
time opened.[2] 
With this disclosure in mind, our investigation does not begin with observations, measurements, or 
statistical data.[3]  Our investigation begins with a problem:  
(I) Cancer rates on Prince Edward Island have increased sharply over the past decade, and, since there seem 
to be a fair number of people in disagreement over possible causation,[4] perhaps this strikes us as a problem worthy 
of our attention.  We propose an initial solution as a theory which we will subject to tests and open to others for 
their criticism and tests.  This brings us to a minor stumbling block and source of unnecessary confusion:
Theory = Hypothesis = Conjecture = Thesis.[5]  
In many contemporary research settings, the variations in the definitions of these terms are often-
misunderstood, disregarded, or used interchangeably.   Thankfully, there's no need for confusion or intimidation by 
the arbitrary interchange between these terms, as this represents an inconsequential and thoroughly avoidable 
1 Descartes 1637, p 1
2 Darwin 1883, p 1
3 Popper 1992, pp 67-68
4 See IU 2008
5 Anon 1999, p 2
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matter of semantics.  This confusion is further exacerbated by the fact that a more recent etymological evolution of 
Thesis = Dissertation.  Thus, will stick with theory, as this term's relatively common usage and relatively clear 
meaning may serve us well:    
“Every scientific theory is a system of sentences... or ASSERTED STATEMENTS or, for short, simply 
statements.”[1] 
Thus, the which we propose for our demonstration is quite simply, a statement:  
Cancer rates on Prince Edward Island have significantly increased (26% in four years)  as a result of a significant  
increase (700% in less than thirty years) of chlorothalonil applications.[2]
Many assert researchers must present the basis upon which their theory was founded; this notion is 
misguided.[3]  Although our theory is based on a simple, logical deduction, associated problems relating to the 
difficulty of establishing causation are significant, yet not insurmountable.
First, our logical deduction:
1. Data in support of a non-linear mechanism for carcinogenicity demonstrate exposure to chlorothalonil 
yields carcinogenicity amongst mammals.
2. Men, women, and children are mammals.
3. Therefore exposure to chlorothalonil is a mechanism for carcinogenicity amongst men, women, and 
children.
4. Men, women, and children throughout Prince Edward island are exposed to carcinogenic levels of 
chlorothalonil which demonstrate a mechanism for carcinogenicity.[4]
5. Therefore exposure to chlorothalonil on Prince Edward Island demonstrates a mechanism for 
1 Tarski 1941, p 3
2 See Delaney 2006, (1).  Also see Mittelsteadt 2006 (1) ;  Abassi 2004 ; Novaczek 2007
3 Popper 1959, pp 7-9;  Also see Whewell 1849
4 With about 7,000 fields spanning 110,000 acres, [Prince Edward Island] produces more than a billion kilograms of potatoes every 
year, making PEI one of the most intensely-farmed areas in Canada.... The crops are sprayed about 20 times per year—every four 
days  in  blight  season—and  the  three  main  fungicidals  used  on  the  potatoes  have  been  classed  as  carcinogens  by  the  U.S. 
government.... 
In a 1999 Environment Canada study... chlorothalonil, also called Bravo, was present in every air sample taken on the island—even in the control  
area which was at the end of a wharf away from any fields. The study also found that concentrations of the fungicide were just as high or higher on  
days when no spraying occurred as on days when it did [italics mine, Delaney 2006, p 1];  Also see Novaczek 2007.
12 of 49
carcinogenicity, morbidity, and mortalities amongst men, women, and children on Prince Edward Island.
In light of the aforementioned difficulty in regards to establishing causation, our next step is to attempt to 
determine if our theory is true, but first we must define truth[1] in contradistinction with certainty:
Knowledge consists in the search for truth—the search for objectively true, explanatory theories… It is 
not the search for certainty.  To err is human.  All human knowledge is fallible and therefore uncertain. It 
follows that we must distinguish sharply between truth and certainty.  That to err is human means not only 
that we must constantly struggle against error, but also that, even when we have taken the greatest care, we 
cannot be completely certain that we have not made a mistake.
     In science, a mistake we make—an error—consists essentially in our regarding as true a theory that is 
not true… to combat the mistake, the error, means therefore to search for objective truth and to do 
everything possible to discover and eliminate falsehoods.  This is the task of scientific activity.  Hence we 
can say: our aim as scientists is objective truth; more truth, more interesting truth, more intelligible truth. 
We cannot reasonably aim at certainty.  Once we realize that human knowledge is fallible, we realize also 
that we can never be completely certain that we have not made a mistake.[2] 
(II)  We proceed and endeavour to determine if our theory is true by attempting to refute (or falsify) our 
theory and by opening it to refutation and falsification attempts by others.  
(III)  If our theory is refuted, we propose another in our attempt to solve the problem.
(IV)  If our theory withstands criticism, we will accept it as true, but the theory will remain forever held 
tentatively, and will remain open to criticism:
1. What, then, are we to trust?  What are we to accept?  The answer is: whatever we accept we should 
trust only tentatively, always remembering what we are in possession, at best, of partial truth (or 
rightness), and that we are bound to make at least some mistake or misjudgement somewhere.[3]
2.  We can never excel others in our reasonableness in a way that would establish a claim to 
authority.[4]
3. No theory is final.[5] 
(V) Let's consider competing theories and all known attempts to refute and falsify our theory.  To our best 
knowledge, they may be encapsulated in the following three critiques:
1 Popper 1963, p 21.  And: I'm a stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that there exist 
objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them. (If science were merely a negotiation of social 
conventions about what is agreed to be ``true'', why would I bother devoting a large fraction of my all-too-short life to it?) (Sokal 
1996c, pp 2-3). 
2 Popper, 1992, p 4
3 Ibid, p 391
4 Ibid, p 227
5 Ibid, p 261
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1. PEI is  known nationwide for... beaches, a  friendly  people, lighthouses..., and for  its  staggeringly  vast 
potato production.  But the... island may soon come to be associated with another, far less benign feature: 
some of the highest rates of cancer and asthma in the country.  Despite repeated assertions from government  
officials that the statistics don't provide any proof (italics mine), many PEI residents believe that heavy pesticide 
use on the island's potato farms is causing high rates of cancer and other diseases.[1]
[Recall that all knowledge is uncertain, proof is impossible, and thus this common line of criticism is 
invalid (be it of naivete or intentional political propaganda.  Thus these untestable and  thus unscientific 
'assertions' may be rejected without further consideration]
2. Labchuk  points  out  that  because  PEI  is  densely  populated—the  most  densely-populated  province  in 
Canada, by far—the  potato  fields  are interspersed among the homes, hospitals, daycares  and schools, 
which means that people are constantly within range of the sprays [True: PEI has no provincial land-use 
policy].  But experts disagree on whether this chemical exposure has resulted in unusually high cancer rates on the  
island [italics mine].[2] 
[These 'experts' represent the grave danger of subjectivism,  [  3 ]   authoritarianism, 4  totalitarianism, and the  
manufacture of consent), and may also be rejected as unscientific.][5]
3. Dr. Ron Matsusaki, emergency room physician at Western Hospital in Alberton, says that in all the years 
he's worked as a doctor both in Canada and the U.S., he hasn't seen cancer rates that come even remotely 
close to what he's seeing in the West Prince area of PEI.  He says he has no doubt that these cancers are 
caused by "an insane amount" of chemical pesticides. Every second household in Mimnegash, a fishing 
village in West Prince surrounded by potato fields, has been afflicted with cancer, according to Matsusaki. 
"West Prince is a laboratory for rare and aggressive cancers.  It's not uncommon to find people who have 
up to ten family members with cancer, that's how crazy it is here."  West Prince resident Noralee Harper 
believes her five year-old-son contracted B cell lymphoma when her family lived next to a potato field. 
She's convinced the chemicals seeped into the well the family used, adding that there are no government 
regulations  in  place  for  testing  pesticide  levels  in  the  island's  drinking  water.  Though  her  son  is  in 
remission now, she says she's  lucky because she knows families who have lost more than one child to 
cancer.  "With each month that goes by, we hear of somebody new we that know personally who's been 
diagnosed with cancer.  It's like the common cold, like a natural part of life.  Living here, we worry non-
stop, it's a daily concern.”  The only doctor to speak out about the link between pesticides and high cancer 
rates on the island, Matsusaki says that although he has received a letter of acknowledgement from the 
Canadian Medical Association, many of his colleagues in the medical profession as well as the Mayor of 
Mimnegash are "in denial" about the severity of the situation.  He believes non-Hodgekins lymphoma is the 
most common cancer in West Prince, followed a close second by renal cell cancer, a particularly aggressive 
cancer that doesn't present symptoms until it's in the latter stages.  PEI Health Minister Chester Gillan said 
in January that he's willing to look at research backing Matsusaki's claims, and if he receives scientific proof  
1 Delaney 2006, p 1
2 Ibid
3 Popper , pp xxxi-xxxii.  Also see Sokal 1996b, pp 126-129 ; Chomsky 1997.
4 A lot of the blame for this state of affairs rests, I think, with the scientists. The teaching of mathematics and science is often 
authoritarian; and this is antithetical not only to the principles of radical/democratic pedagogy but to the principles of science itself. 
No wonder most Americans can't distinguish between science and pseudoscience: their science teachers have never given them any 
rational grounds for doing so. (Ask an average undergraduate: Is matter composed of atoms? Yes. Why do you think so? The reader can 
fill in the response.) Is it then any surprise that 36% of Americans believe in telepathy, and that 47% believe in the creation account of 
Genesis? (1996c, pp 8-9).
5 Popper 1945 ; Herman & Chomsky 1988 ; Sokal 1996 ; Fuller 2000 ; Stiglitz 2001, p 474 ; Shaw 1903, lns 5-11.
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that pesticides are poisoning PEI residents he'll act swiftly to ban the offending chemicals [italics mine].[1]  
[Again, scientific proof (certainty) is, and forever will be, impossible to establish.  This invalid logic may 
stem from the time-inconsistent incentives faced by politicians.  In other words,
(1) the successful politician owes his power to the fact that he moves within the accepted framework of 
thought, that he thinks and talks conventionally. It would be almost a contradiction in terms for a politician 
to be a leader in the field of ideas. His task in a democracy is to find out what the opinions held by the 
largest number are, not to give currency to new opinions which may become the majority view in some 
distant future;[2]
(2) politicians do not find any attractions in a view which does not lend itself to party declamation, and 
ordinary  mortals  prefer  views  which  attribute  misfortune  to  the  machinations  of  their  enemies. 
Consequently people fight for and against quite irrelevant measures, while the few who have a rational 
opinion are not listened to because they do not minister to any one's passions.[3] 
The points regarding notions of 'proof' and 'proving' theoretical propositions are extremely important, and 
once grasped, may serve as valuable problem solving tools themselves, especially in in light of our scholarly duty to, 
like Pyrrho[4] always be on the look-out and never hesitate to offer our criticism;[5] 
For example, several years ago, our present author reviewed  Hollywood Economics: How Extreme Uncertainty  
Shapes the Film Industry,[6] and although the complex arguments and quantum mathematics appeared vaguely sound, 
there was sufficient smoke (displayed ignorance of The Problem of Induction, hubris, and authoritarian assertions[7]) to 
suspect fire an warrant a thorough, critical investigation:  
It would have been hard to imagine at the outset that by applying high-brow mathematical and statistical 
1 See Delaney 2006, p 1
2 Hayek 1982
3 Russell 1928, p 3
4 Sceptic:  A seeker of truth.  One who, like Pyrrho and his followers in Greek antiquity… holds that there are no adequate grounds 
for certainty as to the truth of any proposition…  Those who deny the competence of reason, or the existence of a justification for 
certitude, outside the limits of experience.  The difference between the two usages becomes clearer when considering ‘sceptic’s’ Latin 
origin (scepticus):  inquiring, reflective, assumed by the disciples of Phyrrho as their distinctive epithet…to look out (Oxford English 
Dictionary 1997). 
5 If our civilization is to survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men. Great men may make great mistakes... Their 
influence, too  rarely  challenged, continues  to  mislead  those  on  whose  defence  civilization  depends, and  to  divide  them. The 
responsibility  for  this  tragic  and  possibly  fatal  division  becomes  ours  if  we  hesitate  to  be  outspoken  in  our  criticism of  what 
admittedly is a part of our intellectual heritage.  By our reluctance to criticize some of it, we may help to destroy all of it (Popper 
1945, preface).
6 De Vany 2004
7 Under the influence of passing moods, our critics may have fumbled towards conclusions. They may have acted from impulse and 
prejudice, and used their status to ennoble their hunches. They may have built up their thoughts like inebriated amateur potters. 
Unfortunately, unlike pottery, it is initially extremely hard to tell a good product of thought from a poor one. It isn’t difficult to 
identify the pot made by the inebriated craftsman and the one by the sober colleague… A bad thought delivered authoritatively, though  
without evidence of how it was put together, can for a time carry all the weight of a sound one. But we acquire a misplaced respect for others when we  
concentrate solely on their conclusions–which is why Socrates urged us to dwell on the logic they used to reach them [italics mine, de Botton 2001, 
pp 30-31].
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science we would end up proving Goldman’s fundamental truth [all italics mine].[1] 
Then, perhaps with a heightened sense of scepticism, a fatally flawed, critical assumption the author had 
made became apparent and  lead to a sound falsification of Hollywood Economics' central thesis.[2]
Presently, we will return to the final, sixth stage of the test of our theory: 
(VI)  As Popper notes, “We... leave it to the competition between theories to eliminate the unusable 
ones.”[3]   The previously detailed three-point summary of criticisms directed toward our theory (which represent, 
to the best of our knowledge, all known criticisms to date) do not forward a single competing theory, thus we may 
tentatively accept our theory as true.  In other words, if it were reasonable to believe that, for example, island dairy 
production facilities or Tim Horton's Coffee had been laced with some known carcinogen for the past several 
decades, then the establishment of causation may be more difficult to reasonably determine, but since we have no 
competing theories, we accept our theory as true and therefore valid.
1 Ibid, p. 28
2 See Funk 2007d
3 1992, p 28
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DISCUSSION
We will not make any presumptions regarding the general acceptance of this logical proof, but if readers 
find the plausibility of the democratic rejection of truth (at the provincial level on Prince Edward Island), and thus 
passive, acquiescent, and institutionalized self-destruction difficult to entertain, we apologize that the scope of this 
brief introduction does not facilitate treatment of institutionalized irrational human behaviour.  In the meantime, 
we may consider two relevant conjectures, then view a snapshot of a two-island comparative study:
(1) It is customary to suppose that the bulk of our beliefs are derived from some rational ground, and that 
desire is only an occasional disturbing force.  The exact opposite of this would be nearer the truth: the great 
mass of beliefs by which we are supported in our daily life is merely the bodying forth of desire, corrected 
here and there, at  isolated  points, by  the  rude shock of  fact.  Man is  essentially  a  dreamer, wakened 
sometimes  for  a  moment  by some peculiarly obtrusive  element  in  the  outer  world, but lapsing  again 
quickly into the happy somnolence of imagination.[1]
(2) History shows that our theories have been wrong more often than right, resulting in the demise of 
whole civilizations when we have misinterpreted what is happening to us....
     It would be comforting to believe that humans have been prescient enough to understand what is 
happening  to  themselves  and  act  accordingly.  But...  the  way  the  mind  understands  the  external 
environment—the  beliefs  humans  construct  to  explain  the  external  world  are  frequently  incorrect, 
particularly  if  the  changes  are  creating  really  novel  situations.  And  clearly,  humans  have  evolved 
environments radically different from anything that existed before.[2] 
Now here's our snapshot, a brief compare and contrast of the independent modus operandi on Iceland with 
dependent modus operandi on Newfoundland with three outlined points:
(1) The North Atlantic island communities of Iceland and Newfoundland have much in common.  Both are 
resource-based, export-oriented economies with fish as the major staple...  Both are sparsely populated 
islands of approximately 100,000 km2, with most of the settlements scattered in small communities along 
the coast, leaving the interior virtually uninhabited....
     There are also fundamental differences.  Newfoundland... is one of ten provinces in Canada, whereas 
Iceland is an independent nation.  Newfoundland has experienced high unemployment and low income per 
capita, while  Iceland has  enjoyed almost  full  employment  and  considerably  higher  income per  capita. 
Newfoundland has depended on transfer payments from the federal government for over forty years, with approximately  
half of the provincial government's revenue coming from federal sources  [the ratio is similar on PEI and this is no 
coincidence.[3]
1 Russell 1928.  Also see Herman & Chomsky 1988
2 North 2007, p 26
3 Institutional  factors  in  the  form  of  direct  democracy  (via  initiatives  and  referenda)  and  federal  structure  (local  autonomy) 
systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being in a cross-regional econometric analysis. This positive effect can 
be  attributed  to  political  outcomes  closer  to  voters'  preferences, as  well  as  to  the  procedural  utility  of  political  participation 
possibilities. Moreover, the results of previous microeconometric well-being functions for other countries are generally supported. 
Unemployment has a strongly depressing effect on happiness. A higher income level raises happiness, however, only to a small extent 
(Frey & Stutzer 2000a, abstract).  Also:  Benz & Frey (early release).
17 of 49
     Newfoundland and Iceland have experienced fundamental differences in history, politics, and religion. 
In Newfoundland there have been relatively rigid religious cleavages and class divisions; Iceland has experienced 
these... to a much lesser degree....  Icelanders knew that they came to the island as independent settlers, whereas  
the immigrants to Newfoundland [and PEI] were beholden to the colonial power to protect them  (Jónsson 1995, p 
269-270).
(2) [In Newfoundland], in 1949, after two referendums, a slim majority agreed to Confederation with 
Canada.  Confederation, with its promise of a vastly improved standard of living as a result of Canadian 
social welfare programs and lower prices, gained its greatest support in rural areas, where incomes were 
lowest.
     Confederation confirmed both the hopes of its advocates and the fears of its opponents.  Its immediate  
impact was to increase personal disposable income and consumer spending through social welfare programs, the most  
important of which were family allowance and unemployment insurance.
Joseph Smallwood became the first premier of the province and held his position until his electoral defeat 
in 1972.  Smallwood defended Confederation, first and foremost, on the basis of the transfers it would bring  
about to families....
     In 1954 the Newfoundland Department of Welfare began a program which assisted people in isolated 
communities to move to larger communities.... it continued until 1975.
     In the early 1950's... Smallwood launched a massive program of industrialization.  The purpose of the program was  
both  to  create  economic  growth  and  to  reduce  the  level  of  dependency  on  the  fisheries.  This  program  of 
industrialization largely failed to create the income and jobs expected, and the provincial government had 
to inject massive funds to keep alive the new enterprises.
     Smallwood showed little faith in the fisheries and did not appear to have seen the tremendous potential provided by  
the offshore grounds of Newfoundland (Ibid, p 279-280). 
Recall that this discourse has suggested that, in light of difficulties associated with whole-systems 
complexity, the study of islands may be primary, paramount, perhaps even utterly necessary for human survival; 
that islands may serve us well as lighthouses, as socio-economic and ecological models far more representative and 
descriptive than mathematical models; that island-based analysis enables us to break through myths, and grasp 
global complexity and uncertainty that is beyond our reach.
The three points above which summarize the essence of this discourse do not merely tell the tragic tale of 
The problem of Sustainable Economic Development on Newfoundland.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is true that cancer rates on Prince Edward Island have increased significantly as a result of a significant  
increase of chlorothalonil applications.
We do not, however, follow the misguided assertion that we must attempt to ascribe a probability to the 
truth or validity of our theory in order to attempt to justify our conclusion.  It is simple true, and we may offer no 
more nor more less, because 
the question whether inductive inferences are justified, or under what conditions, is known as The Problem 
of Induction  [italics and capitalization mine].[1]  The problem of induction may also be formulated as the 
question of the validity or the truth of universal statements which are based on experience, such as the 
hypotheses and theoretical systems of the empirical sciences....
     Scientific statements can only attain continuous degrees of probability whose unattainable upper and 
lower limits are truth and falsity’.[2]  
     At this stage I can disregard the fact that the believers in inductive logic entertain an idea of probability 
that I shall later reject as highly unsuitable for their own purposes.  I can do so because the difficulties 
mentioned are not even touched by an appeal to probability.  For if a certain degree of probability is to be 
assigned to statements based on inductive inference, then this will have to be justified by invoking a new 
principle of induction, appropriately modified.  And this new principle in its turn will have to be justified, 
and so on.
     Nothing is gained, moreover, if the principle of induction, in its turn, is taken not as ‘true’ but only as  
‘probable’.   In  short,  like  every  other  form  of  inductive  logic,  the  logic  of  probable  inference, or 
‘probability logic’, leads... to an infinite regress.[3]
 
This rejection of inductive methods represents the essence of Popper's monumental solution[4] to Hume's 
Problem of Induction.[5]  “There is dangerous innocence in the expectation of a future formed on the basis of 
probability.  Any accident to which a human has been subject, however rare, however distant in time, is a possibility 
1  THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
According to a widely accepted view... the empirical sciences can be characterized by the fact that they use ‘inductive methods’, as 
they are called. According to this view, the logic of scientific discovery would be identical with inductive logic, i. e. with the logical  
analysis of these inductive methods. It is usual to call an inference ‘inductive’ if it passes from singular statements (sometimes also 
called  ‘particular’ statements), such as  accounts  of  the results  of  observations  or  experiments, to universal  statements, such as 
hypotheses or theories.  Now it is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements 
from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how 
many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white (Popper 1959, pp 
3-4).
2 Reichenbach 1930, p 186
3 Popper 1959, pp 31-35
4 See Popper 1959
5 See Hume 1739
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we must ready ourselves for.”[1]  Furthermore, this illumination on the deficiencies of probability theory also 
captures the essence of Cournot's earlier (1838) insight: economics and the social sciences at large have been 
erected upon a false and sandy foundation.  And, although Cournot's and Popper's (and Russells and Reichenbach's 
and Hayek's and Taleb's, etc.) realization does find its way to the meek and the few, it generally does not find its way 
to the mighty nor the many, as it does not serve authoritarian institutional interests.  And this problem is ancient: 
Einstein and Popper have both proposed it is borne of an  innate yearning for certainty which began with the 
philosophy of Plato.[2]   But Cournot's realization did find its way to an author, hedge fund manager, and professor of 
Uncertainty Science at NYU:   
I  am  now  convinced  that, perhaps, most  of  econometrics  could  be  useless—much  of  what  financial 
statisticians know would not be worth knowing. For a sum of zeros, even repeated a billion times, remains 
zero; likewise an accumulation of research and gains in complexity will lead to naught if there is no firm 
ground beneath it.[3]  
Funk 2007a;c;d;e examined The Problem of Induction in greater detail, but we will illuminate and 
contextualize this important matter by illustrating the plague of pseudo-scientific inductive inferences by briefly 
returning to Newfoundland.  Kurlansky chronicles the Canadian governments religious faith in one of Britain's 
most authoritarian and influential (and thus, inherently dangerous) scientists in Huxley, and, furthermore, the 
modeling of their fisheries policies on Huxley's authoritarian, inductive logic to the very bitter end: the collapse of 
the great Newfoundland cod fishery.  
At the 1883 International Fisheries Exhibition in London, which was attended by most of the great fishing 
nations  of  the  world, Huxley delivered an address  explaining why overfishing  was  an unscientific  and 
erroneous fear: “Any tendency to over-fishing will meet with its natural check in the diminution of the 
supply,… this check will always come into operation long before anything like permanent exhaustion has 
occurred.”....
     For the next 100 years, Huxley’s influence would be reflected in Canadian government policy. An 1885 
report by L.Z. Joncas in the Canadian Ministry of Agriculture stated: 
The question here arises: Would not the Canadian fisheries soon be exhausted if they were worked 
on  much  larger  scale  and  would  it  be  wise  to  sink  a  larger  amount  of  capital  in  their 
improvement?....   As  to  those  fishes  which,  like  cod,  mackerel,  herring,  etc.  are  the  most 
1 De Botton 2001, p 90
2 Popper 1945
3 Taleb, 2001, p 114.  Also see Taleb 2007
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important of our sea fishes, which form the largest quota of our fish exports and are generally 
called commercial fishes—with going so far as to pretend that protection would be useless to them
—I say it is impossible, not merely to exhaust them, but even noticeably to lessen their number… 
For the last three hundred years fishing has gone on in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and along the coast of our  
Maritime Provinces, and although enormous quantities of fish have been caught, there are no indications of  
exhaustion [italics mine] (pp 121-123). 
 We trust now that it  is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal  
statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no  
matter how many instances of cod we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that cod is inexhaustible. [1]  Every 
inductive inference is inextricably embedded with unquantifiable uncertainty illustrated by this inductive disaster.
Two subsequent opportunities for correction of error:
Only a decade after reassuring the Canadians and the world that the waters around Great Britain “show no 
sign of exhaustion,” such a thing being scientifically impossible, the British discovered that the cod stocks in 
the North Sea had been depleted (p 144). 
Returning to the problem of breathing, eating, and drinking poison on Prince Edward Island:  Extending 
this research and/or building upon the arguments herewith merely yields diminishing margins of return: again, our 
theory is true.  We may, however, always seek further confirmation (and refutation).  If our problem solving 
interests extend beyond scientific inquiry and into Darwin's Struggle for Life (a natural extension, as noted in the 
introduction), the next step to consider would, naturally, entail developing the arguments herewith into a legal 
motion, and filing a class-action law suit (naming Syngenta—the manufacturer of chlorothalonil—the Provincial 
Government of Prince Edward Island, and, perhaps, the Federal government).  Although it could be argued that 
this marks a line of demarcation from the realm of so-called 'scientific method', the methods for a legal case of such 
magnitude (possibly several hundred million $CAD?), would be under such scrutiny, and in the hands of what must 
by definition not be scientific theorists (a jury), that our conclusion must yield truth beyond the slightest (and most 
liberal) shadow of a doubt.  In this case, we could seek data which detail per-capita cancer instances by postal code, 
then plot this data (on a per capita basis) upon a map of Prince Edward Island.  It may also prove fruitful to 
1 Popper 1959, Chapter 1 
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compare this map to an existing map:  The provincial land-use map which details potato production.  We could also 
go into the field and collect primary empirical data by sampling and testing well water (island-wide, of course) as 
thoroughly as time, money, and reason permit.  And naturally, you may wish to gather evidence in the form of 
testimony from the likes of two individuals noted in this paper: former PEI physician Dr Ron Matsusaki and U.S. 
senior toxicologist Dr Timothy F. McMahon.  
Yet always bear in mind mind, despite the assertions of Professors De Vany, Chinneck,[1] and many others, 
even the most convincing, seemingly unquestionable evidence could never prove nor disprove our theory.  We 
sought only truth and we found it.
1 1988, p 2
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FUTURE RESEARCH
Many assert research is incomplete without the inclusion of (1) a review of literature pertaining to your 
problem, attempted solutions, and competing theories and (2) a proposal for future research.  Both assertions are 
false.    Your sole task is to test a theory and make a contribution to knowledge.  Everything else is gravy (though 
potentially helpful, possibly excess fat).  Remember, there is no method.  We suggest an Appendix1 may be a more 
suitable (read: optional) venue for a literature review (thus, see APPENDIX A:  LITERATURE REVIEW).  Again, 
however, there is no method, the choice is yours, and it will vary according to the nature of your problem, 
proposed solution, and your audience.  And, as noted in our introduction, structural requirements from various 
audiences (journals, academic departments, judges and juries, governments, the SEC, NGO's, etc.) may state 
explicit structural requirements which are quite independent of the philosophy of science (and also independent of 
your independent decision to adopt or reject any or all of such so-called 'requirements').  The highly formalized 
nature and mal-aligned equity stakes of peer-reviewed journals (only a small handful of journals are edited by 
individuals whom hold equity in the journal), however,  is largely counter-productive.  Bruno S. Frey[2] surveys this 
problem in his 2002 Publishing as Prostitution? Choosing Between One‘s Own Ideas and Academic Failure:
Even among extremely successful economists, crowned by the Nobel Prize, there are some who harshly 
criticize the existing journal publication system. Examples are Leontief 1971, Coase 1994 or Buchanan 
2000; see more generally Leijonhuvfud 1973 and Cassidy 1996.[3] 
In fact, the insights, clarity, and unhindered accessibility of Frey's working papers serve as a great testament 
to his credibility on this issue.  And, to this point, he draws our attention to a fortunate reversal in the counter-
1 In the Principles, Marshall [1890] confined his use of diagrams and other mathematical notations to footnotes and appendixes so as not 
to allow his mathematics to detract from his economics.  He was interested above all in plain communication—with businessmen as 
well as with students.  Moreover, he was acutely aware that over reliance on mathematics “might lead us astray in pursuit of intellectual  
toys, imaginary problems not conforming to the conditions of real life: and, further, might distort our sense of proportion by causing  
us to neglect factors that could not easily be worked up in the mathematic machine” [Pigou, Memorials, p. 84] (Ekelund, p 341).
2 I believe I have some experience and competence in this area. I have published more than 250 papers in over 140 refereed journals 
during the period 1965–2002. Among them are leading economics  journals  such as  AER, JPE, RES, REcsStats, EJ, JEcLit  and 
JecPersp., but also in political science (e.g. APSR), psychology, law and sociology journals. I have also tried the alternatives to journal 
publications by writing 16 books and by being a columnist for a leading weekly newspaper. I have served as one of the two (and later 
three) managing editors of Kyklos since 1970, am a member of the board of editors of 23 journals and over the years have served as 
referee for numerous journals (Frey 2002, p 6).
3 Frey, 2002 p 15.  Also see Sokal 1996 a,b,c,d ; Chomsky 1997
23 of 49
productive nature of peer-review journals:
The advent of wide spread internet publishing reduces the stifling impact of the refereeing process on the 
papers accepted and submitted to journals. Economics scholars are less bound to devote a large part of their 
time and effort on formalisms.  They have more leeway to concentrate on matters of content.  This greater 
freedom also improves the chances that the advice and suggestions proposed by economic methodologists are 
put into practice, provided they are of practical use for research.  The dominance of orthodoxy is reduced.[1] 
This critical point, however, is merely to mark the distinction between scientific method and the structural 
requirements of various audiences.  Even at the PhD dissertation level, however, the sole requirement is the defense 
of your contribution to knowledge.  Many formalisms, such as the irrational nature of word and page-count 
requirements and or restrictions,[2 are counter-productive:  
Most non-economists—as well as an increasing number of economists—would whole-heartedly agree that 
the economics literature has become arcane and inaccessible, especially so far as the 'serious' (i.e. refereed) 
and most prestigious journals are concerned.  This is only partly due to a specialized language (other social 
sciences also use jargon).  More important is the fact that economists have a high degree of consensus about 
what constitutes high academic quality.  'Good' economics is considered to be abstract and model oriented. 
This automatically gives a premium to formal mathematical work.  Empirical relevance is of secondary 
importance....; real-life problems are not the centre of concern of most economists who publish in the 
leading journals.
     One of the unfortunate results of this definition of 'good' economics is that outsiders find it difficult to 
understand why a particular problem is treated, and if so, why such a high level of formalism is used (Frey 
& Serna 1995, pp 343-344).
And thus, should we become lured into this brothel of peer-reviewed journals, we ultimately fail to 
accomplish what we had set out to do: solve problems.  Instead, we create more problems:[3]
the ordinary citizen is struck dumb with awe when he is told about gold reserves, note issues, inflation, 
deflation, reflation, and all the rest of the jargon.  He feels that anyone who can converse glibly about such 
matters must be very wise, and he does not dare to question what he is told.[4]
Let's consider John Nash's 27 page PhD dissertation,[5] successfully defended in the department of 
1 Frey 2000 p 9
2 Funk 2007e
3 And, in the process, realize the Kuhnian dream: see APPENDIX A.
4 (a) Russell 1956, p 61
(b) My father, who was an unflagging though friendly critic, once told me that I would never again write so good a book as this my 
first one because, as I grew older and wiser, I would “know too much” and the books would inevitably be harder to read (Mead 1928, 
preface).  Also:
(c) There are, so Montaigne implied, no legitimate reasons why books in the humanities should be difficult…; wisdom does not 
require a specialized vocabulary or syntax, nor does an audience benefit from being wearied….Every work presents us with a choice 
of  whether  to  judge  the  author  inept  for  not  being  clear, or  ourselves  stupid  for  not  grasping  what  is  going  on.  Montaigne 
encouraged us to blame the author. (de Botton 2001, p 158).
5 Nash 1950.  Refer to Nash 1951 for a more legible reprint of 1950.
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philosophy at Princeton, the dissertation which was attributed as the contribution to economics which merited 
Nash's 1994 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.  As previously noted, many 
will insists research presentations must begin with a review of literature.  The full extent of Nash's literature review 
begins and ends in the first paragraph of page 1:      
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Indeed, Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) was one of the only two references listed in his Bibliography on 
page 27.  The other reference, we note, was to his own prior work:
We may note two additional observations: Nash did not suggest future research, and, despite Purdue 
University Professor Anon's[1] assertion that dissertations may not be written in the 'We'-imperial 'voice' (the 
stylistic manner in which this paper has been authored, for example), Nash disregarded this common, arbitrary 
formalism as well.
An argument could also be advanced suggesting that both literature reviews and suggested research may 
inject bias, but, again, there is no method: if either or both of the aforementioned constitute an aspect of your 
contribution to knowledge, then so be it.  
This introduction to the problem solving methods has, by design, presented a single-sided (Karl Popper's) 
introduction, but we will shortly serve due notice to a highly influential approach to the philosophy of science 
which is antithetical to much of the philosophy and methods presented herewith; it is arguably also more popular. 
Before doing so, however, we will back-up and address a question readers may be pondering...
Who was Karl Popper?
Karl Popper is generally regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century.  He 
was also a social and political philosopher of considerable stature, a self-professed ‘critical-rationalist’, a 
dedicated opponent of all forms of scepticism, conventionalism, and relativism in science and in human 
affairs generally, a committed advocate and staunch defender of the ‘Open Society’, and an implacable 
1 1999, p 7
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critic of totalitarianism in all of its forms. One of the many remarkable features of Popper's thought is the 
scope of his intellectual influence. In the modern technological and highly-specialized world scientists are 
rarely aware of the work of philosophers; it is virtually unprecedented to find them queuing up, as they 
have done in Popper's case, to testify to the enormously practical beneficial impact which that philosophical 
work has had upon their own.[1] 
Perhaps some readers may also inquire, “If Popper was one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 
20th century, then why haven't we heard of him or read his work?”
This is an interesting and relatively common question amongst philosophy scholars.  Some have suggested it 
is because he never held a chair at Oxford or Cambridge.  Others have noted that
in intellectual circles Popper was very much admired.  But because  The Open Society and Its Enemies was 
hostile  to  so  much  academic  pretension  it  was  treated  less  than  respectfully  by  those  in  the  various 
specialties upon whose turf it trod (Jarvie & Pralong 1999, p 6).
Indeed, many very prominent and influential academics, such as Leo Strauss,[2] condemned and  actively 
lobbied against Popper and his philosophy. 
However, far more, and arguably far greater intellectuals (at least the kind of intellectuals whom are 
awarded Nobel prizes)[3] have, as Zalta noted above, lined up to praise and attest to his methods.  As F.A. von Hayek 
remarked near the end of his 1974 Nobel Lecture, The Pretence of Knowledge:
It is often difficult enough for the expert, and certainly in many instances impossible for the layman, to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims advanced in the name of science…. If we are to 
safeguard the reputation of science, and to prevent the arrogation of knowledge based on a superficial 
similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences, much effort will  have to be directed toward 
debunking  such  arrogations, some  of  which  have  by  now become  the  vested  interests  of  established 
university departments.  We cannot be grateful enough to such modern philosophers of science as Sir Karl Popper for  
giving us a test by which we can distinguish between what we may accept as scientific and what not - a test which I am  
sure some doctrines now widely accepted as scientific would not pass. 
1 Zalta 2006, p 1
2 Steinberg 2003 ; Shultz 2007
3 See Popper 1959
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APPENDIX A: LITERATURE REVIEW
For readers with interest in an alternative, yet sound and complimentary 20-page introduction to scientific 
method, we suggest The Myth of 'Scientific Method' in Contemporary Educational Research (Rowbottom & Aiston 2006):
The  Latin  word  scientia, from  which  our  word  'science'  comes, originally  meant  nothing  more  than 
'systematic knowledge of  the true causes  of  particular things'  (Smith, 1997, p. 16), as  opposed to the 
revealed knowledge that came from religion. It did not mean what we have come to designate in the 20th 
century as the 'natural sciences' (ibid.). It was in the 16th and 17th centuries, in what is usually called the 
Era of Scientific Revolutions, that 'science' began to acquire its modern connotations of empiricism and 
experimentalism. Thus conceived, 'science' began to seem, because of its spectacular successes, the only 
game in town, which is why the social sciences came to be so called and why, riding on the prestige of 
experimental science, some people talk of management science, political science and even the science of 
literary criticism. They do things differently elsewhere. The German language, for example, does not speak 
of  the  social  sciences  but  of  the  Geisteswissenschaften, sometimes  translated  as  the  'humanities'  or  the 
'humanistic study of culture' (literally it means the ways of knowing the human mind or spirit, Geist), and 
distinguishes the  Geisteswissenschaften from the  Naturwissenschaften or ways of knowing the natural world. 
Continental Europe is more hospitable to theory than the Anglophone countries. It is a sobering thought 
that  the  influence  of  the  scientific  paradigm may be  largely an  accident of  history  and of  the  English 
language.
Behind the 'what works' dogma there seem to lurk not only the idea that 'science' supplies the model to 
which all claims to knowledge should aspire, but fantasies and misconceptions concerning science itself. 
Sarah Aiston and Darrell Rowbottom... [noted above] examine these misconceptions, and analyse the false 
contrasts often drawn between 'scientific' and 'non-scientific' approaches. They see here the origins of the 
idea that educational research is centrally a matter of employing particular methods, an idea they find 
prevalent in standard research methods textbooks.[1] 
For those who may hold deeper interests yet, please proceed:
As previously noted, Popper has had many critics, some of which have been the most influential academics 
of the twentieth century.  The most notable (and perhaps most influential) amongst these critics was Leo Strauss:
In 1950, Popper went to Harvard to deliver the prestigious William James lectures. During his time in the 
States he appears to have given a talk at the University of Chicago, where Strauss taught. Strauss told 
Voegelin that the  talk  “was very bad,” “the most washed-out, lifeless  positivism” (Emberly and Cooper 
1993: 67), and inquired of his opinion of Popper. Voegelin replied with a vicious letter. He reports having 
reluctantly read Popper because so many people insist his Open Society is a masterpiece. His judgement is 
that the book is “impudent, dilettantish crap. Every single sentence is a scandal . . .” (ibid.). Noting that 
Popper takes the concept of open society from Bergson, he comments that Bergson did not develop it “for 
the  sole  purpose  that  the  coffeehouse  scum might  have  some-thing  to  botch.” Voegelin  believed  that 
Bergson would have thought that “Popper’s idea of the open society is ideological rubbish” (ibid.). Voegelin 
is  only  just  getting  started. He accuses  Popper  of  “impertinent  disregard  for  the  achievements  in  this 
particular problem area [the history of political thought]” (Emberly and Cooper 1993: 68) and of being 
1 Bridges & Smith 2006, pp 132-133
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unable to reproduce accurately the ideas of Plato and Hegel. Popper is “a primitive ideological brawler.” 
Voegelin then strings more epithets together, “a failed intellectual,” “rascally impertinent, loutish; in terms 
of technical competence as a piece in the history of thought, it is dilettantish, and as a result is worthless” 
(Emberley and Cooper 1993: 67). The reader astonished at this undignified diatribe needs to remember 
that in the book in question Popper is vehement about the duty to think for oneself and not to defer to the 
authority of experts. Strauss and Voegelin agree on the opposite, and on the duty of the enlightened elite to 
defend standards. Strauss had said he was willing to keep Voegelin’s remarks to himself. Voegelin concludes: 
“It would not be suitable to show this letter to the unqualified. Where it concerns its factual contents, I 
would see it as a violation of the vocational duty you identified, to support this scandal through silence” 
(Emberly and Cooper 1993: 69). Following this invitation, Strauss showed the letter to Kurt Riezler, “who 
was  thereby  encouraged  to  throw  his  not  inconsiderable  influence  into  the  balance  against  Popper’s 
probable appointment here [in the US]. You thereby helped to prevent a scandal.” With hindsight one might 
think that the scandal is that someone who had dared to challenge the traditional Germanic learning, the 
worship of the great men, the enemies of science and Enlightenment, is not met out in the open with 
argument, but is disposed of behind the scenes, as quietly as possible, by the self-righteous use of power.
Not all readers, we trust, will value Strauss' position or lend considerable weight to his criticism.  Indeed, 
some readers, perhaps, may, in light of  Strauss' positions, influences, protoge's, and associates, suspect that Popper's 
philosophy may indeed hold the Constitution of Liberty,[1] and perhaps even a tentative solution to perhaps the greatest 
and gravest problem facing humankind, the solution to Popper's first manifesto,[2] namely an attack on enemies of 
the Open Society:
In  a  June  17, 1996  article  by  Richard  Lacayo,  Time magazine  named  the  late  University  of  Chicago 
philosopher Leo Strauss (1899-1973) as one of the most influential and powerful figures in Washington, 
D.C.—the man most responsible for the Newt Gingrich "Conservative Revolution" on Capitol Hill, and 
the intellectual godfather of [Gingrich's] "Contract on America”.
     If Strauss' influence on politics in the capital of the most powerful nation on Earth was awesome in 
1996, it is even more so today. The leading "Straussian" in the Bush Administration is Deputy Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who was trained by Strauss' alter-ego and fellow University of Chicago professor 
Allan Bloom. Wolfowitz leads the "war party" within the civilian bureaucracy at the Pentagon, and his own 
protégé, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, is Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff and chief national security 
aide, directing  a  super-hawkish  "shadow  national  security  council"  out  of  the  Old  Executive  Office 
Building, adjacent to the White House. According to Bloom biographer Saul Bellow, the day that President 
George H.W. Bush rejected Wolfowitz and Cheney's demand that U.S. troops continue on to Baghdad, 
during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Wolfowitz called Bloom on his  private phone line to bitterly 
complain. It seems that "Bush 41" was not enough of a Nietzschean "superman" for Wolfowitz's taste…. 
     On March 3, in a widely circulated radio interview on the Jack Stockwell Show in Salt Lake City (see 
EIR, March 14), Lyndon LaRouche had singled out Strauss as one of the leading intellectual figures… 
steering the United States into a disastrous replay of the Peloponnesian War, which led to the collapse of 
Athens. Within days of the LaRouche interview, Leo Strauss was the subject of a series of public attacks, in 
the German, French and American media… for his  role in producing the current  generation of  neo-




     Indeed, author Shadia  B. Drury, in her  1997 book,  Leo Strauss  and the  American Right, named the 
following  prominent  Washington  players  as  among  Strauss'  protégés: Paul  Wolfowitz; Supreme  Court 
Justice Clarence Thomas; Judge Robert Bork; [neo-conservative] propagandist and former Dan Quayle 
chief  of  staff, William  Kristol; former  Secretary  of  Education  William  Bennett; the  National  Review 
publisher William F. Buckley; former Reagan Administration official Alan Keyes; current White House bio-
ethics advisor Francis Fukuyama; Attorney General John Ashcroft; and William Galston, former Clinton 
Administration domestic  policy advisor, and co-author, with Elaine Kamark, of  the  Joe Lieberman-led 
Democratic Leadership Council's policy blueprint.
     Earlier Strauss allies and protégés in launching the post-World War II neo-conservative movement were 
Irving  Kristol,  Norman  Podhoretz,  Samuel  Huntington,  Seymour  Martin  Lipset,  Daniel  Bell,  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, and James Q. Wilson….
     The hallmark of Strauss' approach to philosophy was his hatred of the modern world, his belief in a 
totalitarian system, run by "philosophers," who rejected all universal principles of natural law, but saw 
their mission as absolute rulers, who lied and deceived a foolish "populist" mass, and used both religion 
and politics as a means of disseminating myths that kept the general population in clueless servitude. For 
Strauss  and all  of  his  protégés  (Strauss  personally had 100 Ph.D. students, and the  "Straussians"  now 
dominate most university political science and philosophy departments), the greatest object of hatred was 
the United States itself (Steinberg 2003). 
Indeed, perhaps future generations may thank Leo Strauss for criticizing Popper in the same way we may 
thank Aristotle for criticizing those brave, anonomous Greek citizens who had the courage to criticize slavery:  If it 
weren't for Aristitle's criticisms, we would have no account that there were significant objections amongst the 
citizenry to slavery at all.[1]
The second-most dominant line of criticism direct towards Popper:  The most heavily cited reference on 
the philosophy of science in the twentieth century was not a book by Karl Popper.  It was a book written by another 
philosopher of science:  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) by Thomas Kuhn.  One very favourable aspect of 
the philosophy of science is that there are two very clear, well-marked, and heavily travelled contemporary points 
of departure:  Kuhn and Popper:  
(1)  The  Kuhn-Popper  debate, strictly  speaking, refers  to  an  encounter  that  took  place  at  the  former 
Bedford College, University of London on 13 July 1965, as part of the International Colloquium in the 
Philosophy of Science. It was designed to pit a relatively young theorist of science (Kuhn, aged 43) whose 
1962 book,  The Structure of  Scientific  Revolutions, was touted as the latest word from the United States, 
against a relatively old theorist of science (Popper, aged 63) whose seminal book,  The Logic of Scientific  
Discovery, had been translated into English on in 1959, a quarter-century after it first appeared in German.[2]
1 Popper 1945
2 Fuller 2003, p10
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(2) Kuhn and Popper tapped into long-simmering, deep-rooted disagreements that went well beyond the 
pages  of  their  major  works  on  science….  Sometimes  behind  such  scholastic  fodder  that  frames 
philosophical debate lie opponents who are not so different from each other after all…. But sometimes the 
stereotype, for all its crudeness, does [italics Fuller’s] capture differences in sensibility that become deeper 
the more one looks.  This is certainly the case with Popper and Kuhn.[1] 
(3) The clash between Popper and Kuhn is not about a mere technical point in epistemology.  It concerns 
our  central  intellectual  values, and  has  implications  not  only  for  theoretical  physics  but  also  for  the 
underdeveloped social sciences and even moral and political philosophy.[2] 
This author's very brief assessment of the Kuhnian revolution is as follows:  Kuhn wrote an encyclopaedia 
article on the philosophy of science which was ultimately published as Kuhn (1962).  In this article, Kuhn detailed 
the dominant institutional (authoritarian academic and government institutions) phenomena in scientific research: 
feedback loops and herding behaviour (which he famously termed paradigm).  This observation was in-part (1) 
misconstrued as a blueprint for  the method of science, and (2) adopted as the method of science for and by the 
authoritarian institutions whom benefited most from its adoption: the dominant academic institutions and the 
dominant cold-war era United States.  Indeed, U.S. political and U.S. academic institutional credibility and 
dominance were near an all-time highs; a very strong argument may, afterall, be tabled that the Manhattan project, 
borne out of Princeton, had possibly saved the world.  The book has indeed been noted as the perennial favourite of 
politicians:  Al Gore has stated that it is his favourite book and George Bush has claimed to have read it as well 
(though researchers have not found confirmation that Bush has read any books).  Indeed, we submit its great appeal 
to politicians may stem from its position on subjectivism (everything, including truth, is negotiable), relativism, and 
authoritarianism.  Indeed, Popper traces Kuhn's philosophical lineage to Plato:
The greatest  principle of all  is  that nobody, whether male or female, should be without a leader. Nor 
should the mind of anybody be habituated to letting him do anything at all on his own initiative ; neither 
out of zeal, nor even playfully.  But in war and in the midst of peace—to his leader he shall direct his eye 
and follow him faithfully.  And even in the smallest matter he should stand under leadership.  For example, 
he should get up, or move, or wash, or take his meals… only if he has been told to do so.  In a word, he 
should  teach  his  soul, by  long  habit, never  to  dream of  acting  independently, and  to  become utterly 
incapable of it.[3]
Popper's philosophical lineage, on the other hand, traces back to Plato's teacher, Socrates.  Reviewing the 
1 Ibid, pp14-15
2 Lakatos 1978, vol 1, p 9
3 Republic, c. 360 B.C
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literature on this contemporary philosophical debate will invariably lead to philosophers from both schools (Plato 
left Socrates's school, so to speak, to start a school of his own; Plato's first pupil was Aristotle).  These lineages are 
assembled in Popper (1945).  
Although this author is tempted to cite Popper's positions on Kuhn's philosophy, the object of this review is 
to draw our attention to the fact that an antithetical approach to the method of science exists and that our proposed 
problem solving technique may be presented in error.  Recall that this tenant is central to our method:  “We can 
never excel others in our reasonableness in a way that would establish a claim to authority.”[1]  You will not discover 
this acknowledgement of uncertainty in Kuhn (1962).  Again, however, we encourage readers to follow their own 
independent-minded processes of discovery regarding this weighty debate.  Fuller (2000) is excellent, but heavily 
opinionated in Popper's favour.  Stanford (2004) provides a more even assessment, and serves as an excellent 
introduction to Kuhn.  Unfortunately, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was Kuhn's only major work, and, not 
long after the debate cited above, Kuhn stepped out of both the public and academic spotlights and refused to grant 
interviews.  Thus, many open questions pertaining to his philosophy were left to students such as Feyerabend 
(1975) to answer.  
Kuhn's students may or may accurately reflect his philosophy.
Popper, on the other hand, was one of the most prolific philosophers of any century, granted a stream of 
interviews, and is published in over fifty languages.  His complete bibliography lists 1292 entries and is 132 pages 
long (which we will happily forward upon request). 
For an alternative, brief introduction to Popper, consider Anderson (2004).  We highly suggest, however, a 
first-hand encounter:       
Perhaps the best first-hand introduction to Popper is In Search of a Better World (1992), which could be 
followed up with its sequel, All Life is Problem Solving (1999).  These two collections represent a distillation of 
Popper's opus, assembled during the last decades of his life.  
1 Ibid, p 227
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Alternatively, Popper's first major work, written while in exile in Australia from the Nazi Germany, The  
Open Societies and Its Enemies (1945).  Popper mailed the original manuscript (his only copy!) to his fellow Austrian 
and close friend, F.A. von Hayek, at the London School of economics.  Hayek procured a publisher, then later 
procured Popper's position at LSE.  The topical, contemporary aspect of this great work is that, although it was 
written during the rise of Nazi Germany as cautionary tale regarding the rise of 'Closed' (totalitarian) Societies, it is 
very difficult to read this text today without drawing uncanny parallels with post-Eisenhower U.S. foreign policy. 
The Open Societies and Its Enemies' central thesis echoes in Hayek (1944).[1]
Researchers in the natural sciences will be well-served by Popper's magnum opus, The Logic of Scientific  
Discovery (1959), but we would encourage any researcher considering the acceptance of inductive logic to review 
chapters I (which surveys the problem of induction), II (On the Problem of a Theory of Scientific Method), III (Theories), 
and VIII (Probability).  The original manuscript for this great works has been reported to have been anywhere 
between 2,000 and 5,000 pages (our present edition is 513), but the extensive Appendices were published as 
individual volumes which may be of interest to researchers in the natural sciences.
Our final recommendation to consider as secondary and tertiary readings to complement those noted 
above:  Conjectures and Refutations:
 The essays and lectures of which this book is composed are variations upon one very simple theme--the 
thesis that we can learn from our mistakes. They develop a theory of knowledge and of its growth. It is a 
theory of reason that assigns to rational arguments the modest and yet important role of criticizing our 
often mistaken attempts to solve our problems... Though it stresses our fallibility it does not resign itself to 
skepticism, for it also stresses the fact that knowledge can grow, and that science can progress - just because 
we can learn from our mistakes.[2] 
Popper was influenced by members of his peer group, the Vienna Circle, his good friend F.A. von Hayek, 
and especially by the teachings of Socrates,[3] Democritus, Xenophanes Einstein, Wittingstein, Reichenbach,[4] and, 
1 Is there a greater tragedy imaginable than that, in our endeavour consciously to shape our future in accordance with high ideals, we 
should in fact unwittingly produce the very opposite of what we have been striving? (Hayek 1944, p 4).
2 Popper 1962, p xi
3 I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he knows something, although he 
knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than 
he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know (Socrates 399 BC).
4 Reichenbach 1930 ; 1938 ; 1940 ; 1942 ; 1949
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perhaps most significantly, the great logician and founder of analytical philosophy, Bertrand Russell:[1]
A follower of the Enlightenment speaks as simply as possible: we want to be understood.  In this respect 
Bertrand Russell is our great master.[2]
Many of their writings express analogue and complementary philosophies.  For an equalled panorama of 
the western philosophical landscape upon which these philosophies rest, Russell (1945) is simply without equal, 
thoroughly enjoyable, and thus very highly recommended.
And with Russell in mind, in hindsight, it seems likely we have not stressed the extraordinary, positively 
essential role sharp criticism plays in the problem solving process, indeed in the process of the growth of all 
knowledge.  We will offer two closing remarks on this point:
(1) The results of failure in politeness, however bad from the point of view of social occasion, are admirable 
from the point of view of dispelling myths.  There are two ways in which our natural beliefs are corrected: 
one the contact with fact, as when we mistake a poisonous fungus for a mushroom and suffer pain in 
consequence; the other, when our beliefs conflict, not directly with objective fact, but with the opposite 
beliefs of other men.[3]
(2) It is not only the hostility of others that may prevent us from questioning the status quo.  Our will to 
doubt can be just as powerfully zapped by an internal sense that societal conventions [italics mine] must have a 
sound basis, even if we are not sure exactly what this may be, because they have been adhered to by a great 
many people for a long time.  It seems implausible that our society could be gravely mistaken in its beliefs 
and at the same time that we would be alone in noticing the fact.  We stifle our doubts and follow the flock 
because we cannot conceive of ourselves as pioneers of hitherto unknown, difficult truths.[4]
And finally, after borrowing these three used, tested, very high-mileage ideas, I might also add that, from 
an economics perspective, the search for truth, the endeavour to test new theories and new ideas is very costly. 
Thus, it may prove fruitful, as we have done so throughout this paper, to hang your arguments and build upon as 
many sound, old, tested ideas as possible:
Most economists enter this market in new ideas, let me emphasize, in order to obtain ideas and methods 
for the applications they are making of economics to the thousand problems with which they are occupied: 
these economists are not the suppliers of new ideas but only demanders.  Their problem is comparable to 
1 Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of 
comforting fairy tales.  It is not good either to forget the questions philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves we have found 
indubitable answers to them.  To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralysed by hesitation, is perhaps the 
chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can do for those who study it (Russell 1945).  Also see Russell 1908 ; 1915 ; 1922 ; 1928 ; 
1940 ; 1948 ; 1953 ; 1956.
2 Popper 1999, p 206
3 Russell 1928, pp 17-18
4 De Botton 2001, p 13
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that of the automobile buyer: to find a reliable vehicle.  Indeed, they usually end up by buying a used, and 
therefore tested, idea. Those economists who seek to engage in research on the new ideas of the science - to refute or  
confirm or develop or displace them - are in a sense both buyers and sellers of new ideas.  They seek to develop new ideas  
and persuade the science to accept them, but they also are following clues and promises and explorations in the current  
or preceding ideas of the science.  It is very costly to enter this market: it takes a good deal of time and thought to  
explore a new idea far enough to discover its promise or its lack of promise.  The history of economics, and I assume 
of every science, is strewn with costly errors: of ideas, so to speak, that wouldn’t run far or carry many 
passengers [italics mine].[1]
1 Stigler 1982, p 57
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APPENDIX B:  ISLAND BIOECONOMICS PROBLEM SOLVING
For those readers particularly interested in the peculiarities and nuances of various island-based methods, 
Baldacchino (2007) is also without equal, marks the best entrance to the world of island, and delivers a first-rate 
bibliographical review of island studies.  We will merely note a few exceptional and foundational works: Darwin 
(1859), Carlquist (1974), and Wallace (1880).  Arnason, Felt, Bartmann, & Cairns (1995) and Baldacchino, 
Greenwood, MacKinnon, & Bartmann (1998), and Baldacchino, Milne, Bartmann, Srebrnik, Paterson, & Jolliffe, 
(2000) were the three foundational collections of our Institute of Island Studies and offer very insightful island 
methods and case studies.  The best case studies, however, are likely only to be discovered by living, studying, and 
problem solving on islands.
Although we submit islands offer significant opportunities for problem solving, we trust by now, dear 
reader, that, since subject matters, including the subject matter of 'scientific method', do not exist, 'Island 
Bioeconomics' does also not exist.  Thus, we notate our recognition of the value of modelling various aspects of 
relative insularity as Island Bioeconomics Problem Solving:[1]
Islands serve as lighthouses, as synecdoches,[2] socio-economic and ecological models far more representative 
and far more descriptive than mathematical models.[3]  Although our island-based methods do employ mathematics, 
they do so  in the opposite direction[4] common to 'continental' economic analysis.  These methods have been 
developed and adopted in light of our recognition of two fundamental economic methodological problems: (1) 
1 Funk 2007e
2 Islands are synecdoches: their understanding facilitates a ‘coming to grips’ with a more complex whole. They also act as advance 
indicators or extreme reproductions of what is future elsewhere. Crucial, new insights into evolutionary theory, and the realization of 
so much species differentiation on islands in modern zoogeography, are primarily due to the unwitting and haphazard stumbling of 
what, at first sight, may have appeared to be inconsequential, island-based, island-specific fieldwork. This includes such investigations 
as the study of Darwin’s finches on the Galapagos Islands (Darwin, 1979; Lack, 1947) or Alfred Wallace’s study of birds-of-paradise 
on the Aru Islands (Wallace, 1975)… The forays of Bronislaw Malinowski amongst the Trobriand (or Kiriwina) Islanders of Papua 
New Guinea (1922), Margaret Mead to Samoa and the Admiralty Islands (1928; 1934) and Raymond Firth to Tikopia (1936) led to 
the birth of ethnography (Baldacchino 2007b, p 9).
3 Taleb 2001, p 177 ; Menger & Hayek 1871, p 15 ; Maxwell 1873, p 400 ; Pigou, Memorials, p. 84 ; Hayek 1945, pp 519-530 ; Hayek 
1945, pp 519-530 ; Stiglitz 2001, p 475 ;  Hayek 1956, pp 519-520.
4 Russell 1919, pp1-2 & pp 194–195 
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economics is a derivative science[1]  hereto lacking a tenable theory of value,[2] and (2) that applied mathematical 
models invariably do not represent truth, because integers do not compete for natural resources and sexual 
selection.
Darwin’s powerful and effective island-based analysis enabled us to break through convenient myths,[3] 
attendant myths,[4] and grasp global complexity and uncertainty that was beyond our reach; using similar methods 
Collapse of Easter Island: Lessons for Sustainability of Small Islands[5] echoes Von Bertallanfy: “The island microcosm can... 
help to simplify understanding... related to larger and more complex system dynamics.”[6]  And “although it is often 
said that the Origin of Species convinced people of evolution because it provided an easily-understood mechanism 
(natural selection) for evolution, the deluge of articles and books published in 1909, 50 years after the origin, show 
clearly that it was principally the facts of geographical distribution that had convinced the majority.”[7]
In other words, Darwin was able to  describe a very large complex, closed system (earth) by modeling it with much smaller, 
1 See Russell 1938
2 See Stigler 1982
3 Modern industrial civilization has developed within a certain system of convenient myths [italics mine]. The driving force of modern 
civilization has been individual material gain which is accepted as legitimate, even praiseworthy, on the grounds that private vices 
yield public benefits in the classic formulation. Now it’s long been understood, very well, that a society that is based on this principle 
will destroy itself in time. It can only persist with whatever suffering and injustice it entails as long as it’s possible to pretend that the 
destructive forces that humans create are limited, that the world is an infinite resource, and that the world is an infinite garbage can. 
At this stage of history either one of two things is possible. Either the general population will take control of its own destiny and will 
concern itself with community interests guided by values of solidarity and sympathy and concern for others. Or alternatively, there 
will be no destiny for anyone to control. In this possibly terminal phase of human existence, democracy and freedom are more than 
values to be treasured, they may well be essential to survival (Chomsky 1992, Finale).
4 Human  events  spring  from passions, which  generate  systems  of  attendant  myths [italics  mine].  A man  who  has  suffered  some 
humiliation invents a theory that he is King of England, and develops all kinds of ingenious explanations of the fact that he is not 
treated with that respect which his exalted position demands. In this case, his delusion is one with which his neighbours do not 
sympathize, so they lock him up. But if, instead of asserting only his own greatness, he asserts the greatness of his nation or his class 
or his creed, he wins hosts of adherents, and becomes a political or religious leader, even if, to the impartial outsider, his views seem 
just as absurd as those found in asylums. In this way a collective insanity grows up, which follows laws very similar to those of  
individual insanity.  Every one knows that it is dangerous to depute with a lunatic who thinks he is King of England; but as he is 
isolated, he can be overpowered. When a whole nation shares a delusion, its anger is of the same kind as that of an individual lunatic if 
its pretensions are disputed, but nothing short of war can compel it to submit to reason (Russell 1928, pp 6-7).
5 Nagarajan 2006
6 Baldacchino, 2007, p 84.
7 Italics mine, Baldacchino, 2007, p 202.
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simplified, semi-closed systems (islands).[1]  Island processes are amplified through compression[2] and thus, relative to 
continents, exhibit explosive rates of evolution.[3]  Therefore islands may enable us to model our Earthly future, to observe  
socio-economic, political, and ecological conditions on islands (of various degrees of insularity) and to model future global  
implications:  The Problem of Breathing, Eating, & Drinking Poison on Prince Edward Island today is the Problem of Breathing, 
Eating, & Drinking Poison on Earth tomorrow:
All  across  North  America  rates  of  cancer,  thyroid  dysfunction,  learning  disabilities,  birth  defects, 
environmental sensitivity and other debilitating health conditions are unacceptably high.  The costs of these 
trends are crippling for health care systems, social programs and budgets of all levels of government.[4]
Island Bioeconomics Problem Solving is an island-based methodological approach to economics which rests on a 
foundation of a theory of value based on relative insularity.  Although this methodological approach addresses 
economic inquiries pertaining to any and all geographical locales, we submit you may discover this approach 
addresses the false and sandy foundations5 of economics which are especially vexing to those who inhabit islands.[6]  
But if this method accomplishes nothing else, we hope that it will at least truthfully and irrefutably 
demonstrate that we are all islanders!  
1 Compared  with  continents…  [islands]  have  a  restricted  area  and  definite  boundaries,  and  in  most  cases  their  biological  and 
geographical  boundaries coincide. The number of species and of genera they contain is always much smaller then in the case of  
continents, and their peculiar species and groups are usually well defined and strictly limited in range… their relations with other 
lands are often direct and simple and even when they are more complex are far easier to comprehend than those of continents 
(Wallace 1880, pp 241-242). 
2 It appears almost all ecological and evolutionary processes…are amplified on islands; generally speaking, the smaller the island, the 
more amplified these processes are. Small size and low diversity seem to be the main factors. With populations existing in miniature, 
they are prone to stochastic, or random, processes…. Such a mosaic of habitats in a tiny area promotes evolutionary radiation. 
Conversely, the small size of islands means that they are exquisitely vulnerable to biological invasion and disturbance as there are few 
distance  barriers  to  dispersal, and  few areas  are  immune  to  disturbance  by  inaccessibility. On the  plus  side, ‘amplification  by 
compression’ makes islands particularly useful…on islands, process that may be subtle on continents tend to be more clearly exposed 
(Baldacchino 2007b, p 193). 
3 Rapid evolution of island immigrants is not only possible but frequent.  Change after arrival is inevitable.
     “Explosive” evolution is demonstrated by various groups that have had good ecological opportunities [italics Carlquist's 1974, p 
20].
4 Novaczek 2007, p2.  Also see Barry 2005
5 Keynes 1936
6 My first visits to the developing world in 1967, and a more extensive stay in Kenya in 1969, made an indelible impression on me. 
Models of perfect markets, as badly flawed as they might seem for Europe or America, seemed truly inappropriate for these countries 
[and/or SIDS, Stiglitz 2001, p 473).
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Economic  Development.  Over  the  past  century, a  landfill  of  literature  dedicated  to  this  topic  has  revealed  a 
significant  and  near-universal  error: Those  most  able  to  navigate  the  perilous  seas  of  economics, astutely 
demonstrate that neoclassical economic theory fails to pass the test of the second law of thermodynamics, then 
proceed to report this finding as if at long last Stigler's  Problem of Value had been solved.  Text books, refereed 
journals, and working papers (especially those denoting “Ecological Economics” as key words) alike conclude 
that, based upon this revolutionary new perspective, we are now positioned to reshape economic theory and policy.  The 
primary problem, which appears to elude them all is this: economics is a derivative science, not a primary science. 
This  paper  employs  Island  Bioeconomics Problem  Solving—an island-based  economic  modelling  technique—in 
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development.  This theory produces a robust, innovative and counterintuitive solution for Sustainable Economic  
Development, and, perhaps a tenable solution to The Problem of Global Warming.   
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(1) Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, 
42 of 49
that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience (Hume 1739, 
Book I, Vol I, p 137). 
(2)  To falsify a knowledge-claim is to provide evidence that it is false. Since the time of David Hume, empiricist 
philosophy  of  science  has  struggled  with  the  problem  of  induction: namely, how  is  it  possible  to  justify 
inference, from a finite set of instances, to the truth of a universal law whose scope is potentially infinite? In the 
absence of a convincing answer to this question, our everyday and scientific belief in a regular, ordered, and 
predictable universe must seem to be a physiologically indispensable, but still irrational, habit of mind. 
The original approach to this problem pioneered by Karl Popper involved a reasoned rejection of the question 
itself. Popper accepted that the problem of induction was insoluble, but it did not follow that science was 
irrational, or that it could not progress. Instead of seeing discovery of the truth as the aim of science, we should, 
rather, see scientific activity as a systematic attempt to ‘falsify’—or refute—bold and imaginative conjectures 
about the nature of the world.  Popper's formulation of this principle is widely acknowledged as one of the most 
original contributions to the modern philosophy of science1.
(3) It took a remarkably long time before the novelty of the intellectual situation was grasped. Few realized 
what had happened. David Hume…saw that a great step forward had been taken, but he did not understand just 
how great and how radical this advance in human knowledge really was. I am afraid that even today many people  
still do not fully understand this [italics mine] (Popper 1992, p 36). 
(4)  The classical  notion of science as true, secure and sufficiently justified knowledge still  flourishes even today  [italics 
mine]. But it was overtaken sixty years ago by the Einsteinian Revolution; by Einstein’s gravitational theory. 
The outcome of this revolution is that Einstein’s theory, whether true or false, demonstrates that knowledge in 
the classical sense, secure knowledge, certainly is impossible. Kant was right: our theories are free creations of our  
intellect, which we try to impose upon nature. But we are only rarely successful in guessing the truth; and we can never be  
certain whether we have succeeded. We must make do with conjectural knowledge [italics mine] (Popper 1992, p 37).
(5) Hume has permanently influenced the development of the best of philosophers who came after him. Man 
has an intense desire for assured knowledge. That is why Hume’s clear message seemed crushing [italics mine] (Einstein 1956 
p 21-22).
(6) There is a problem in inference well-known as the problem of induction. It is  a problem that has been 
haunting  science  for  a  long  time, but  hard  science  has  not  been  as  harmed  by  it  as  the  social  sciences, 
particularly economics, even more the branch of financial economics (Taleb 2001, p 117).
(7)  The assumption that  economists (italics  Hayek’s)  can find predictable  solutions  to  economic problems is 
undoubtedly the  most  inhibiting force in… economics. It  has  led  to the  increasing  isolation of  theoretical 
economists  from  the  day-to-day  practitioners  of  the  subject—the  actual  participants  in  an  economy, the 
consumers and the producers (Hayek 1991, p 9). 
(8) Kant, in his  Critique of Pure Reason, asserted under the influence of Hume that pure speculation or reason, 
whenever it ventures into a field in which it cannot possibly be checked by experience, is liable to get involved 
in  contradictions  or  ‘anti-anomies’ and  to  produce  what  he  unambiguously  described  as  ‘mere  fancies’  ; 
‘nonsense’ ; ‘illusions’ ; ‘a sterile dogmatism’ ; and ‘a superficial pretension to the knowledge of everything’ 
(Popper, 1945, vII, p38). 
(9) Reared on Merton’s and Scholes teachings of efficient markets, the professors [Nobel Laureates Robert S. 
Merton and Myron Scholes] actually believed that prices would go and go directly where the models said they 
should.  The professors’ conceit was to think that models could forecast limits of behavior.  In fact, the models 
could tell them what was reasonable or what was predicable based on the past” (Lowenstein 2000, p. 234).
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(10) Belief that tomorrow’s risks can be inferred by from yesterday’s prices and volatilities prevails at virtually 
every investment bank and trading desk.”  (Ibid, p. 235). 
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the world, and a sizeable rural population literally living on the doorstep of the spraying (p 1).
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Pesticides  are  designed  to  kill,  and  scientific  evidence  increasingly  supports  the  public’s  perception  that 
exposure to even small amounts - whether in the air we breathe, the water we drink or the food we eat - is 
likely to increase our risks of contracting cancer or suffering other impacts such as thyroid dysfunction and 
nervous system impairment. Of particular concern are impacts on children which can include increased risk of 
ADD/ADHD and violent personality disorders; impacts on pregnant women and both men and women of 
childbearing age, in the form of increased rates of birth defects; and impacts on people whose health is already 
poor, such as the elderly infirm and people with highly sensitive or compromised immune systems.  
We know from the 1999 provincial water quality report, and from the federal government’s air quality research, 
that mixtures of pesticides at parts per billion concentrations can be found in domestic wells close to potato and 
blueberry fields; that an even greater array of toxins are detectable in PEI streams and rivers; and that airborne 
pesticides, especially the fungicide chlorothalonil, are in every breath we take over the summer and autumn 
agricultural season.  This is not just a human health issue but one that affects the whole food chain.  Recent 
laboratory studies performed by Dr Wayne Fairchild of DFO indicate that such low concentrations (ppb) of 
certain commonly used insecticides are lethal or damaging to larval lobsters.  Clams in estuaries such as the Mill 
River  already  exhibit  a  haemolytic  disease  that  in  other  jurisdictions  has  been  linked  to  toxins  in  the 
environment.  And fish kills continue to plague our rivers despite efforts to control runoff of pesticides and 
fertilizers from agricultural land....
All across North America rates of cancer, thyroid dysfunction, learning disabilities, birth defects, environmental 
sensitivity and other debilitating health conditions are unacceptably high.  The costs of these trends are crippling 
for health care systems, social programs and budgets of all levels of government.  Demographic research reveals 
that  on  PEI,  despite  the  absence  of  heavy  industry,  the  bucolic  landscape  and  appearance  of  pristine 
environments  that  attract  tourists, we  suffer  from higher  than  average  rates  of  cancer  compared  to  other 
provinces, even after controlling for our ageing population.  Thyroid problems, ADD in children, asthma and 
environmental diseases are also serious concerns....
On PEI, we have a population of 138,000 on a total land base of 566,000 hectares.  Just under half of the land is 
used for agriculture; between 6 and 9% is under municipal governance - around 40,000 hectares.  PEI’s annual 
pesticide sales amount to over 1.1 million kg of active toxic ingredients/yr: that’s 8 kg/yr for every man, 
woman and child living on the island – far in excess of the North American average (1.5 kg/person/yr).  
Estimates from other jurisdictions suggest that 90% of all pesticides sold are applied for agricultural purposes, 
with about 10% being used at the household level.  Urban use of pesticides, although less than agricultural use 
in terms of total annual weight, is of concern because these applications are made intensively, in environments 
where humans are most concentrated.  Also, urban pesticide users apply a relatively greater amount of highly 
toxic insecticides, whereas agricultural chemicals used on PEI are predominantly (by weight)  fungicides and 
herbicides.
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Typically, application rates  for agricultural  pesticides are in the range of  0.8-1 kg of  active ingredients  per 
hectare.  On PEI we may have an anomalous situation, judging from Environment Canada research that shows 
that potato fields may receive more than 6 kg ai/hectare over the growing season.  In general, urban garden 
applications of pesticides in Canada are similarly intense, averaging 3-4 kg ai/hectare.  Much of this intensive 
pesticide application–probably in excess of  100,000 kg ai/yr–is being applied in our top 10 most populous 
municipalities  where over 70% of Islanders  live and many more work–most  notably in Charlottetown and 
Summerside (pp 1-3).
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All the great scientists realized that every solution to a scientific problem raises many new and unsolved 
problems. Our knowledge of our ignorance, becomes increasingly conscious, detailed and precise, the more we 
learn about the world. Scientific research is the best method we have for obtaining information about ourselves 
and about our ignorance. It leads us to the important insight that there may be great differences between us 
with regard to minor details of what wed may perhaps know, yet we are all equal in our infinite ignorance (, p 
40). 
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international dealings it is only on minor issues that it depends on law, but when large issues are involved it depends  
upon war or the threat of war.  It has been customary to accept economic power without analysis, and this has led, 
in modern times, to an undue emphasis upon economics, as opposed to war and propaganda, in the causal 
interpretation of history.  
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Abstract: The lecture focuses on the reasons that new ideas are accepted or rejected by a science.  A distinction 
is  drawn  between  pre-scientific  and  scientific  stages  of  a  discipline.  The  diverse  fates  of  new ideas  are 
illustrated by a variety of episodes in the history of economics, including the economics of information and the 
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(1) In economics the most fundamental of these central problems is the theory of value. The theory of value 
must explain how the comparative values of different goods and services are established. Until that problem is 
solved, it is not possible to analyse for scientific purposes what will be produced and in what quantities, how the 
resources will be employed in producing the menu of outputs, and how the resources will be valued. Without a 
theory of value the economist can have no theory of international trade nor possibly a theory of money. This 
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